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Abstract: Most philosophers addressing the issue of meaning in life seem to think that non-
human animals cannot have a meaningful life because only humans have what it takes to do 
so. In this paper, I discuss three prominent philosophical theories of meaning in life, all of 
which implicitly or explicitly deny non-human animals the possibility of living a meaningful 
life. I will argue that none of them is convincing and that we should embrace a more 
comprehensive and inclusive understanding of meaning in life that allows for non-human 
lives to be meaningful and in their own right worth living. 
 
“If there is no God”, William Lane Craig once remarked (Craig 1994, 45), “then our life is 
not qualitatively different from that of a dog”, by which he meant to say that it would be 
completely meaningless and have no value whatsoever. Whether Craig is right about God is a 
question I am not going to discuss here. Instead, what I shall focus on is whether he is right 
about dogs.  
Clearly, Craig’s dog is a proxy for all non-human animals. There can be little doubt that non-
human animals are capable of having good lives, just as much as humans are, although what 
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makes life good for them may be different from what makes life good for us (Hauskeller 
2018). However, can they also have meaningful lives? Most philosophers addressing the issue 
of meaning in life seem to think that they cannot and that only humans have what it takes to 
live a meaningful life (two recent exceptions are Purves & Delon 2018 and Thomas 2018). 
Accordingly, the life of people who are believed to live a meaningless life is frequently 
compared to the life of animals: it is, supposedly, repetitive, without sense of time, not 
creative, not aspiring to anything higher, unreflected, dedicated to the pursuit of the lower 
pleasures, and revolving around the most basic (or basest) interests. For many philosophers 
writing about meaning in life, the life of non-human animals, or more precisely what we 
imagine such an animal’s life to be like, is the perfect foil to the meaningful life that humans 
are expected to aspire to. Thus Thaddeus Metz claims that we find meaning in life precisely 
by transcending our animal nature and connecting to goods that lie beyond what we share 
with other (“lower”) animals. What we share is being alive, having a healthy body, exercising 
one’s perceptual capacities, and experiencing pleasure, none of which is fit “to make one’s 
existence significant” (Metz 2013, 29). A meaningful life is one that “merits great esteem or 
admiration” (ibid, 34) because of that life’s bearer’s “sophisticated contouring” of their 
“rational faculties toward fundamental conditions of human life” (ibid, 41), which is not 
possible for non-human, and that means essentially non-rational, animals.  
In the following, I shall look into the assumption that is tacitly being made here: that the life 
of a non-human animal cannot be meaningful; I will discuss some of the justifications given 
for it, its apparent implications, and its plausibility.  
 
What do we mean when we talk about meaning? 
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So what exactly are we talking about when we talk about meaning in this context? On the 
face of it, lives, be they human or non-human, do not seem to be the kind of things that can 
have meaning. Only things that are about other things can have meaning. This sentence, for 
instance, has a meaning. When I say ‘This sentence has a meaning’, what I mean is that the 
sentence ‘This sentence has a meaning’ has a meaning. The meaning of the sentence ‘This 
sentence has a meaning’ is that the sentence ‘This sentence has a meaning’ has a meaning. 
My life, on the other hand, has no meaning, or if it does, its meaning appears to be different 
from that of a sentence. A sentence has a meaning because it says something, and because it 
does it can be read and understood and should be read and understood in a certain way. My 
life does not say anything, it just is, which is why it should not be read and understood in a 
certain way. Indeed, it cannot be read and understood at all (even though I may feel tempted 
to do so anyway). In that sense at least, sentences can have meaning, while lives cannot.  
Yet it is also clear that, for us, lives can very well be meaningful or meaningless, or more or 
less so. We know this because we feel it, or more precisely because we feel something that 
we try to capture with the word ‘meaning’. Before all else, what we call meaning in life is an 
experiential reality, and we are most keenly aware of that reality when it is absent, when our 
own life, or that of somebody else, appears to be devoid of meaning. That experiential reality 
can be expressed in different ways. A life that appears ‘meaningless’ is a life that is lived 
without conviction, in which the things we do seem to have no point. It is a pointless life that, 
we feel, makes no difference, that is inconsequential, a life that does not matter or matter so 
little that it could just as well not be lived, just as a meaningless sentence is one that could 
just as well not be said or written. It is an empty, purposeless life, one that is felt to provide 
us with no good reason to live it, a life that appears, ultimately and all things considered, not 
worth living. (Philosophers like to make distinctions, and they are right to do so. However, 
our actual experience does only rarely adhere to the neat distinctions we make. Here, 
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distinctions are often blurred. Thus, although it may well be possible to distinguish sharply 
between the pointless, the indifferent, the inconsequential, the purposeless, the meaningless, 
and the not-worth-living, in reality they often blend into each other.) 
If a life is felt, by the one who lives it, to be meaningless in that comprehensive sense, their 
life can reasonably be expected to not only be meaningless (to them), but also unhappy. It 
would be difficult to understand somebody who told us that they find their life not worth 
living, but that they are nonetheless very happy. That they find their life not worth living is an 
expression of their unhappiness or the particular form it assumes. In other words, at least part 
of what they mean when they say that they feel their life is not worth living is that they are 
unhappy with the way their life is going. We can of course be unhappy for other reasons than 
that we find our life meaningless. We can for instance be unhappy because we are poor and 
find it difficult to make ends meet, or because we are ill and hurting, or because we face 
problems in our life that we don’t know how to overcome. But we can also be unhappy, and 
indeed profoundly unhappy, despite being healthy, not having to worry about money, and 
having no real problems in life, for the sole reason that we don’t see a point in living, or at 
any rate in our way of living. Sometimes we are unhappy because we encounter obstacles on 
our chosen life path, and sometimes we are unhappy because we feel that there is something 
wrong with the life path that we have chosen (or that has been chosen for us). And there are 
indeed lives or ways of living one’s life that strike us as not particularly meaningful, for 
instance when we spend most of our life doing things that we don’t really care about just to 
make enough money to survive and to be able to continue doing those things, or when we 
spend our life doing things that we believe we do care about, but that seem to be not really 
worth caring about, like collecting bottle caps or watching trains and writing down the 
numbers of the engines. Yet then again, even if we spend our lives in pursuit of something 
that is commonly regarded as meaningful, such as helping other people, or creating great art, 
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or making scientific discoveries that allow humanity to advance in some way, or any of the 
other things that are commonly associated with the idea of a ‘meaningful life’, we can still 
reach a point where we wonder what, ultimately, all this is good for. Sometimes, even the 
things that are generally agreed to have a point can appear quite pointless to us.  
So where does this leave us? We have seen, or so I have argued, that the question of meaning 
in life arises mostly when said meaning is felt to be missing, and when it is felt to be missing, 
we are unhappy. A life felt to be meaningless is an unhappy life, although not every unhappy 
life must also be felt to be meaningless, since sometimes we are unhappy for other reasons 
than a perceived lack of meaning. However, what we have not ruled out yet is the possibility 
that someone may lead a happy, but meaningless life, which would only be an option if we 
can mistakenly feel that our life is meaningful, while in fact it is not. That this is possible is 
suggested by (usually imagined and therefore not very reliable) cases where a person is 
extremely happy doing something that most of us (those of us with more lofty ambitions) find 
utterly trivial and insignificant. It is difficult to see a life as worth living that is, for instance, 
spent mostly watching daytime soaps requiring a minimum of higher brain activity, even if 
enjoyed thoroughly. But then again, it is also difficult to imagine a person with normal 
human capacities actually being happy doing this and not much else in their life. If we 
actually found somebody who appeared completely happy watching soaps all day, every day, 
we could not but wonder how this was possible: how anyone can be happy living their life 
like that. Yet if they really are happy, then we should expect that they also see some point in 
what they are doing, and if they don’t, then they are unlikely to be happy. Just like we cannot 
be truly happy if we think that our life is pointless and not really worth living, we cannot 
think of our life as pointless and not worth living if we are happy. A happy life is always 
meaningful for the one who lives it. Only if we look at it from the outside and privilege the 
third-person perspective over the first-person perspective can we doubt that what appears to 
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be meaningful to someone really is meaningful. That happens when we fail to see the point in 
what they appear to see a point in doing. While they may find their life worth living, we 
don’t. We feel and think that we would not want to live our life like that and perhaps also that 
people should not live their life like that. 
 
Susan Wolf’s Fitting-Fulfilment Theory of Meaning 
It is this intuition that has led several philosophers, most notably Susan Wolf, to surmise that 
happiness or subjective fulfilment is not sufficient to make a life meaningful. Something else 
is needed, a connection to something that lies outside of us. If you love doing something that 
is not really worth doing or at any rate not really worth loving, Wolf has argued, then doing it 
does not make your life meaningful. It may well be true that without love (for something that 
lies outside of ourselves), or more precisely the active engagement with something that we 
love, or that we love engaging with, our lives lack meaning, but Wolf insists that love is only 
necessary, but not sufficient. There are some things we do out of love that we shouldn’t really 
be doing at all. In those cases our love is misplaced. We love something that we shouldn’t 
love, see value in something that in fact does not have any value, or at any rate not as much 
value as we think it has. Meaningful is our loving engagement only if what we engage with 
deserves the love and attention that we bestow on it. Meaning, Wolf claims, “arises from 
loving objects worthy of love and engaging with them in a positive way.” (2012, 8) Meaning 
in life is thus neither purely subjective, nor purely objective. In order for there to be meaning 
in our lives, the subjective (love, appreciation, and the peculiar fulfilment that results from 
our active engagement with what we love) and the objective (that what we love is actually 
worthy of being loved) need to come together. Meaning “arises when subjective attraction 
meets objective attractiveness.” (2012, 9) Fulfilment, in Wolf’s terminology, is, although 
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subjective, more than just pleasure. It is the specific kind of pleasure (or positive feeling) that 
arises from an engagement with what is taken to be objectively good. Wolf insists, however, 
that subjective fulfilment is not enough. If Sisyphus were not frustrated, but on the contrary 
completely fulfilled by his never-ending task of pushing a boulder up a hill, if he thought that 
pushing a boulder up a hill is a really (objectively) good thing to do, a worthy end, then this 
would not suddenly make his life meaningful. What he is doing would still be pointless, 
simply because perpetually pushing a boulder up a hill for no good reason is not an 
objectively worthy end. Fulfilment, according to Wolf, only makes our lives meaningful if it 
is a fitting fulfilment.  
The problem with this approach is, of course, that it is far from easy to say exactly which 
activities or ‘objects’ merit our love and our being fulfilled by them, and which do not. Wolf 
suggests that the things that we are fittingly fulfilled by are things that offer us an opportunity 
to develop our powers, realize our potential, or achieve excellence (2012, 36-37), but does 
not want to rule out that there may be others that do not meet those criteria and with which to 
engage is still fittingly fulfilling. What she insists on, though, is that it is not enough for an 
object to give us pleasure. An activity can be very pleasurable to me, even very interesting, 
but may still be meaningless if what pleases or interests me is not of the kind that merits my 
attention. It would only merit my attention if its value exceeded the value that it has as an 
object of my pleasure or interest, or if its value had a different source than my pleasure or 
interest. We need to connect with and be concerned about a value that exists “outside of 
ourselves”, so that it can, in principle, also be accessed and appreciated by others. “A 
meaningful life is one that would not be considered pointless or gratuitous, even from an 
impartial perspective.” (2012, 42) The trouble is, however, that a truly impartial perspective 
is nowhere to be found. All perspectives are necessarily partial. There is no view from 
nowhere. Instead, all views are from somewhere. Accordingly, even though it may seem to 
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me that your life is pointless, the fact that my perspective on your life is not your perspective, 
i.e., not the perspective of the one who lives it, does not make my perspective impartial. And 
even if everybody else thought your life was meaningless, then this assessment would still 
not be impartial. It would simply be not your assessment, but somebody else’s. Yet despite 
acknowledging that it “is far from clear what a reasonably complete and defensible 
nonsubjective account (of value) will look like” (2012, 47), Wolf insists that we need to 
assume that certain things we do are objectively valuable to account for the fact that some 
lives do not strike us as meaningful even though they are lived in active engagement with an 
object of love (for instance those of people who find subjective fulfilment in caring for a 
goldfish, which Wolf does not see as a fitting fulfilment). If our intuitions are to be trusted, 
then it seems that it is not sufficient to find something we love and then just do it: we also 
need to find the right, objectively worthy thing. 
Should we trust this intuition? There are good reasons not to. For one thing, it is very much 
based on our own (considered, if you will) preferences in life or what we happen to think 
constitutes a worth-while life for us, and for another because we have no clear understanding 
of what makes a thing or an activity objectively worthy. If there is something objective about 
our considered preferences, it is the potential to do some truly remarkable things that we 
know human beings have and that we often see unfulfilled in some (or indeed the majority of) 
humans. That may be regrettable, but it does not make the lives of those who do not, or only 
partially, actualize this potential, pointless and not worth living, and it most certainly does not 
make the lives of those pointless who never had that potential in the first place (such as non-
human animals) or perhaps not even of those who have lost it (such as some dementia 
patients). We find our points where we can. If a human being who should know better lives 
like a dog, then we may have some (objective) grounds for judging their lives 
(comparatively) meaningless because that kind of life is not fitting for a human being given 
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what a human being is capable of, but for a dog to live like a dog is perfectly fine. Indeed, 
what could be more fitting for a dog than to live like one? If the lives of non-human animals 
were indeed pointless and hence not really worth living, then this would seem to imply that 
the destruction of such a life would be a matter of little or no importance. This is the main 
reason why the issue merits scrutiny. A life that is not worth living is also a life that can be 
destroyed without loss. The death of a being whose life does not matter does not matter 
either. Thus, how we answer the question of whether non-human animals can have 
meaningful lives may have considerable practical consequences.  
 
Antti Kauppinen’s Teleological View of Meaning 
Wolf contends that non-human animals cannot have meaningful lives because they are 
incapable of loving things and activities that are objectively worthy of love. According to 
Metz their lives are meaningless because they are incapable of transcending their animal 
nature and thus have no access to higher goods. Neither is very convincing, mainly because 
of the uncertain and rather dubious status of what are presumed to be objective or higher 
goods. However, there may be other reasons for concluding that non-human animals cannot 
live meaningful lives. Antti Kauppinen for instance suggests that in order to be meaningful, 
what a life needs more than anything else is a good plot: it needs to be narratable (cf. also for 
a similar view Rosati 2013).  
Kauppinen understands meaning as one of two properties that makes a life good for the one 
who leads it, the other one being happiness (or pleasure). Both together constitute human 
well-being. Since happiness (pleasure) and meaningfulness are distinct properties, a life can 
be happy but meaningless, and also unhappy but meaningful. While happiness is the final 
good for passive subjects of experience, meaningfulness is the final good for active agents 
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(Kauppinen 2012, 372). Since we are both, experiencers and agents, the best life for us is one 
that contains (a maximum of) both happiness and meaning.  
That the passive or experiential side of our being makes for one sort of good, while the active 
or agential side makes for another, is an interesting idea and certainly worth considering. It 
does not necessarily exclude non-human animals from living meaningful lives either. It all 
depends on whether non-human animals are thought to be agents, which in certain respects 
they certainly are, but apparently not in the respects that Kauppinen thinks are relevant in this 
context. It is less agency as such that in his view generates the orientation towards meaning 
as a final good, but rather the ability to look back and plan ahead, to perceive one’s life as 
being stretched out in time, surpassing the needs and rewards of the present moment (which 
is an ability that most, if not all, non-human animals appear to lack). Meaningfulness unfolds 
gradually over time and is thus, according to Kauppinen, ultimately a property of a life 
considered as a whole. Whether a moment or period in my life is meaningful or not depends 
not only on what is happening during that period, but also on what happened before and what 
will happen later. In other words, my life now is, properly speaking, neither meaningful nor 
meaningless. My life now may well contribute to the overall meaning of my life (which can 
be more or less meaningful), but not because it is in itself meaningful, but because it helps 
create the narrative shape that makes (or perhaps better: will have made) my life as a whole 
meaningful. Meaning is not additive, which means that a life’s (degree of) meaningfulness 
cannot be determined by adding up all the meaningful bits or periods in it and possibly 
subtracting all meaningless or “anti-meaningful” bits, as some have suggested (e.g. Metz 
2013, 64, or Campbell and Nyholm 2015).  
So what exactly makes a life meaningful? Kauppinen lists a series of key features, which, 
when present in somebody’s life, makes it appropriate for them to feel a certain pride and joy, 
and appropriate for us to admire and feel inspired by them. Key features of a meaningful life 
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are: that the goals pursued are objectively valuable (!), that pursuing those goals challenges 
the agent’s abilities, that nobody else can replace the agent in their pursuit, that the goals are 
pursued with some degree of success, that success is lasting rather than fleeting, and, perhaps 
most importantly, that the agent’s life “forms a coherent whole”, meaning that “past efforts 
increase the success of future goal-setting, goal-seeking, and goal-reaching” (2012, 346). 
Because it is so much goal-focussed, Kauppinen calls this particular conception of 
meaningfulness teleological. This view is summed up in the formula “life is ideally 
meaningful when challenging efforts lead to lasting successes.” (ibid) If good things happen 
to us, this is good, but it is even better (namely in terms of meaningfulness) if we had to work 
hard to make them happen, and the harder we had to work to get them, the better (more 
meaningful) our lives are. Furthermore, although getting what we want is good, it is even 
better – and here Kauppinen echoes Wolf and Metz - if what we want is good (i.e. worthy of 
being wanted), and the better what we want is, the better our lives are. It is even better still if 
what we get will last, and the longer it lasts the better our lives are. Kauppinen holds that 
meaningfulness is an objective quality of lives: “Just as a food can be unhealthy for a person 
even if she thinks it is healthy, a life can be meaningless for someone even if she thinks it is 
meaningful.” (2012, 356) However, as far as I can see, Kauppinen does not attempt to 
provide an argument for this claim, the reason probably being that what is important for him 
is not this, but that we understand meaning in terms of narrative shape. “A meaningless life is 
one that is not going anywhere or moving forward.” (357)  
If we accept Kauppinen’s account, then it would seem to follow that non-human animals are 
not capable of living meaningful lives, good lives perhaps (as in happy lives), but not 
meaningful ones. Galen Strawson makes the point that “even dogs and horses can be the 
subject of excellent biographies” (Strawson 2008), and maybe they can, but it is difficult to 
imagine them writing their own autobiographies, and not only because they cannot read and 
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write, but because their “ability to look back and plan ahead” appears to be rather limited. All 
this goal-setting, goal-seeking, and goal-reaching that Kauppinen finds so essential for a 
meaningful life is not exactly absent from the lives of cats and dogs and other non-human 
animals, but to the extent that it exists it is comparatively narrow in terms of time and scope. 
We don’t expect them to be making plans for their retirement or swapping stories about their 
youth. We could perhaps provide a narrative of their lives with a decent plot, but it is doubtful 
that they could. And for most non-human animals it is probably true that their life is “not 
going anywhere or moving forward”. Yet why should it have to go somewhere at all? Why 
can it not stay what and where it is? It may be true that non-human animals tend to live in the 
present moment and that the future or the past means little to them, but if living in the present 
is pointless and ultimately not worth living, why would an orientation towards the future and 
an existence that is more aware of its temporal extendedness make it more worth living? 
After all, as Schopenhauer once pointed out, nobody ever lives in the future or the past. At 
the end of the day (and indeed throughout the day), we all, humans and non-humans alike, do 
the actual living of our lives exclusively in the present. 
 
Richard Taylor’s Conscious-Creation View of Meaning 
That it is our sense of temporal extendedness that provides the foundation for a life that is 
meaningful and worth living has also been argued by Richard Taylor, in a remarkable 
reversal of the position he originally endorsed, which makes it particularly interesting in the 
present context. While in his seminal paper “The Meaning of Life” (Taylor 1970) he had 
argued that all that is required for a meaningful life (and “the nearest we may hope to get to 
heaven”) is that there is something in it that we pursue energetically, an “inner compulsion” 
to do whatever it is we do (which would allow us to regard as meaningful even the endlessly 
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repetitive life of a blind worm in a cave and the endlessly repetitive life of a Sisyphus who 
desires nothing more than pushing boulders up hills), he later (Taylor 1987) renounced the 
claims he made previously, now arguing that even the life of a happy, passionately boulder-
pushing Sisyphus (let alone that of a blind worm in a cave) is far from meaningful because it 
lacks one crucial ingredient: creativity. True creation, however requires genuine newness, 
which is only possible if time is real. 
Contrary to the countless philosophers, from Plato to McTaggart, who have claimed that time 
cannot possibly be real, Taylor very sensibly insists that it feels far too real to be an illusion. 
On the other hand, however, the reality of time is very much dependent on us. If there were 
no creatures like us, Taylor suggests, time would not be (fully) real. Imagine a world entirely 
devoid of life. Such a world would have no “history or meaning” (Taylor 1987, 297). Time 
may exist in some abstract way, but it is completely irrelevant because it “makes no 
difference” what happens when. In that sense, time in such a world is not real yet. Now add 
living beings to this world (but still holding back on rational beings). According to Taylor, 
time has now been introduced to the world, but still only in a very rudimentary sense. 
Importantly, a world containing living but not rational beings would still be a world without 
history because nothing genuinely new ever happens in it. “The sun that rises one day 
illuminates nothing that was not there the day before, or a thousand or million days before. It 
is simply the same world, age after age. (…) Every sparrow is just like every other, does 
exactly the same things in the same way without innovation, then to be imitated by every 
sparrow to follow. The robin or squirrel you see today does nothing different from those you 
saw as a child, and could be interchanged with them without discernible difference.” (Ibid, 
298) Animals live their lives in “unchanging cycles”, “to be repeated over and over, forever.” 
Such a repetitive world, however, a world that goes nowhere, is not only a world without 
history, but also, precisely for this reason, a world without meaning. This is because in a 
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world without history “nothing is ever created” (Ibid, 299), at least not in the way that would 
be required to make what someone creates meaningful. For that, the creative act must be 
freely chosen. Whatever someone creates “must be something of his own, the product of his 
own creative mind, of his own conception, something which, but for his own creative thought 
and imagination, would never have existed at all.” (Ibid, 300) This, Taylor insists, is a kind of 
creative activity that cannot be found in nature: it requires rational beings “who can think, 
imagine, plan, and execute things of worth”. Everything that may strike us as an example of 
immense creativity in the non-human world, like “the complex beauty of the spider’s web” or 
“the ingenious construction of the honeycomb”, is in fact just another example of “endless 
repetitions”, a “capacity of fabrication”, which discloses “not the least hint of creative power” 
(Ibid, 301). True creativity brings forth things that are genuinely new. Only humans have that 
kind of creativity, though not everyone has it in the same degree. According to Taylor, 
creative power has an “indescribable worth”, which is why it gives human existence its 
significance and meaning: “That a world should exist is not finally important, nor does it 
mean much, by itself, that people should inhabit it. But that some of these should, in varying 
degrees, be capable of creating worlds of their own and history – thereby creating time in its 
historical sense – is what gives our lives whatever meaning they have.” (Taylor 2012, 303) 
Does it, though? Taylor argues that without us, or without rational beings, time would not be 
(fully) real because there would not be any history, and that a world without history is a 
world in which nothing “new” happens. Such a world is declared to be meaningless not 
because the past is not remembered, but because the past is supposed to be more or less (that 
is, in all relevant respects) identical to the present, as the future will be identical to the 
present. Yet whether or not it is, largely depends on what we choose to mean by “new”. In 
many ways there is undeniably newness even in a world without life. Continents form and 
fall apart, seas dry out, and flat surfaces fold into mountains. And there are even more 
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changes, more new things happening, in a world populated by living, though not rational 
beings. Species come and go; old ones change, then disappear, new ones gradually enter the 
stage. And those new species could not have been predicted. None of those changes could 
have. So in what sense exactly is all that has happened in the world since its creation before 
the arrival of human beings devoid of newness? Perhaps in the sense that even though this 
particular kind of animal never existed before, animals have, and this one is just more of the 
same. But we could say the same about human productions, even highly artistic and original 
ones. A new nocturne of Chopin’s (one of Taylor’s examples of true newness) is different 
from the previous ones, but it would still be a nocturne, and still be a musical composition. 
And even though Chopin might be different from other composers, he is still a composer who 
basically does what other composers also do, namely compose stuff. It is not possible to draw 
a clear distinction between the genuinely or relevantly new and the ordinary and not really 
new. 
Neither is the claim particularly convincing that every sparrow is the same as every other, 
doing exactly what all other sparrows do and have done since the beginning of time (or the 
beginning of sparrows). To a casual observer this may indeed appear to be the case, but if you 
look more closely you will find that even sparrows are individuals and do not generally 
behave exactly like any other sparrow. And for each one of them, what they do is very new to 
them, as if it were in fact the first time that it is being done. (That is actually the advantage of 
having no history: an abundance of newness.) The problem with casual observers is that they 
are also lazy observers. Of course, all sparrows do what sparrows do. Although even whole 
sparrow populations may occasionally learn new things when they adapt to a changing 
environment, they still live a sparrow life, and the general features of that life are well 
defined and fixed. But the same is true for us. We are alike in many ways, and behave alike in 
many ways. Everything we do is confined by the human life form. We do what humans do 
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and never go beyond that. In sum, there is more newness in a sparrow’s life and less newness 
in a human life than Taylor is willing to allow for. 
 
What is the point of an animal’s life? 
Still, if the life of a non-human animal does not really connect with the things that we feel 
(rightly or wrongly) inclined to regard as objectively valuable, and if non-human animals 
have no understanding of their life as a whole and are incapable of consciously creating new 
worlds the way we can, then we may well wonder what the point is of their existence. What 
exactly are they good for? It has occasionally been suggested that the life of a non-human 
animal may acquire meaning by being put to an important use. Thus, Viktor Frankl in his 
holocaust memoir Man’s Search for Meaning, when wondering whether there is any meaning 
to human suffering even though we may not be able to grasp it, proposes that the suffering of 
“an ape which was being used to develop poliomyelitis serum, and for this reason punctured 
again and again” (Frankl 1959, 121) would be meaningful, though not in a way that the ape 
would be able to understand. It would therefore be subjectively meaningless, but nonetheless 
objectively meaningful (like, perhaps, the life of a prisoner in a concentration camp). From 
this it would seem to follow that we could make the lives of non-human animals (more) 
meaningful by subjecting them to (if necessary painful and even deadly) experiments or other 
invasive practices that have the potential of resulting in some benefit for humanity, because 
then their lives would finally have a point, which otherwise they don’t. 
William James played with the same idea in his essay “Is Life Worth Living?”: “Consider a 
poor dog whom they are vivisecting in a laboratory. He lies strapped on a board and shrieking 
at its executioners, and to his own dark consciousness is literally in a sort of hell. He cannot 
see a single redeeming ray in the whole business; and yet all these diabolical-seeming events 
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are often controlled by human intentions with which, if his poor benighted mind could only 
be made to catch a glimpse of them, all that is heroic in him would religiously acquiesce. (…) 
Lying on his back on the board there he may be performing a function incalculably higher 
than any that prosperous canine life admits of”. (James 1895, 58) To be fair, James loved 
dogs, but he was also a scientist of his time and as such believed that vivisection was often 
necessary to gain knowledge. So he tried to convince himself that the suffering non-human 
animals were routinely subjected to was ultimately justified, that it was meaningful, hoping 
against hope and his better judgement. He struggled with the issue his whole life (cf. 
Campbell 2015). 
Yet contrary to what James suggests here, knowing that his suffering is all part of a big plan 
and will actually benefit humanity is unlikely to provide much solace to the tortured dog. If 
that makes his life meaningful, it is not the kind of meaning that anyone, dog or human, 
would like their life to have, at least not primarily. It may be an added bonus or better than 
nothing, but in itself it is a long way from making a life worth living. To think that a non-
human animal’s life would somehow be better or more meaningful if it in some way 
improved our lives is more than anything else an expression of our human arrogance and 
sense of entitlement. Kurt Baier, in an early paper on the meaning of life (1957) misleadingly 
claims that we do not usually think that a thing is better for having a purpose. “A row of trees 
growing near a farm may or may not have a purpose: it may or may not be a windbreak, may 
or may not have been planted or deliberately left standing there in order to prevent the wind 
from sweeping across the field. We do not in any way disparage the trees if we say they have 
no purpose, but have just grown that way. They are as beautiful, made of as good wood, as 
valuable, as if they had a purpose. And of course, they break the wind just as well.” The 
same, Baier claims, holds for animals: the sheep dog or watch dog is no better than the “dog 
that hangs around the house and is fed by us.” (Baier 1957, 120) 
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This is, of course, only partly right. When it comes to animals and plants we do in fact tend to 
assign value to them in accordance with their perceived utility. Many people would probably 
value the sheep dog and the watch dog more highly than a dog that just hangs around the 
house (except when the latter is perceived to satisfy a strong emotional need), simply because 
they are perceived to be more useful. They are indeed better, namely for a certain (human) 
purpose. Similarly, a useful tree will be regarded more highly than a “useless” tree. Its 
usefulness makes it the better tree. However, even though it may not be true that a living 
being that serves a (human) purpose is not usually considered to be any better than one that 
serves no purpose, what we should be able to say with greater confidence is that a living 
being that has no purpose is in no way worse off than one that does, which means that life is 
just as much worth living for the no-purpose dog as it is for the sheep dog, watch dog, or 
companion dog. Baier does not see this because he is not much interested in non-human 
animals, which does not prevent him from making the following very keen observation: man, 
he says, “is in a different category, however. To attribute to a human being a purpose in that 
sense is not neutral, let alone complimentary: it is offensive. It is degrading for a man to be 
regarded as merely serving a purpose.” (Ibid.) This is a very important insight: having an 
assigned purpose would not enhance our worth in our own eyes; it would diminish it. Yet if 
that is so, if having such a purpose would actually degrade us, then this suggests that far from 
being a precondition of a meaningful (human or non-human) life, having an assigned purpose 
would actually make one’s life less meaningful because it would then not be lived on its own 
terms, but on somebody else’s terms. Baier does not explicitly say this, but it is clearly 
implied. If my life has a purpose allotted to me by God or whoever, then my own purposes 
count for nothing or little. Yet it is these purposes that allow me to experience my life as 
meaningful. It follows that only if there is no meaning of my life, can there be meaning in my 
life. The same holds for non-human animals: if there is a purpose to their lives that we have 
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chosen for them, then this does not make their lives more meaningful, but, on the contrary, 
less so, simply because there is less room for them to develop, explore and pursue their own 
purposes. To be truly meaningful, the purposes we have cannot lie outside of us. They must 
be our own purposes. Only if my life has no point, i.e. if it is not good for anything else, does 
the actual living of my life have a point. As a younger (and wiser) Richard Taylor put it: “The 
point of living is simply to be living, in the manner that it is your nature to be living.” (Taylor 
1970, 28) 
 
Appreciating the meaningfulness of non-human lives 
That the point of living is simply to be living does of course not mean that living is always 
meaningful. We may sometimes choose, or more likely be forced, to live in a way that is not 
our nature to be living, and then our living becomes pointless. Life can be meaningful only 
for beings that can experience the absence or loss of meaning. If an animal’s life could never 
be meaningless, then it could not be meaningful either. But it can be meaningless because it 
can be felt to be meaningless, and it is felt to be meaningless when the one who lives it is 
prevented from living it the way it is their nature to live it. A paradigmatic case is a large 
animal confined to a small space. Such an animal is apt to feel like Rainer Maria Rilke’s 
panther, locked in a cage in Paris’s Jardin des Plantes: “His gaze against the sweeping of the 
bars/ has grown so weary, it can hold no more./ To him, there seem to be a thousand bars/ and 
back behind those thousand bars no world.” (The translation is Stanley Appelbaum’s.) The 
life of Rilke’s panther has clearly lost its point. It has become meaningless (despite its 
possible entertainment value for the zoo’s visitors) and appears no longer worth living. Yet 
unconfined and in its natural habitat, the panther’s life would be, unquestioningly, worth 
living. For the panther, it would be a rich life, full of meaning, full of reasons to live. The life 
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that a non-human animal is naturally equipped to live always means something to them, 
perhaps more than ours to us. Animals suffer from depression only when they are held in 
captivity, while we manage to feel depressed by our life despite being free to live differently. 
Something is not quite right here. Leo Tolstoy, in his Confession, remarks that our lives are 
now meaningless because we have lost our way: we do not live our lives the way we ought 
to. Non-human animals generally do a much better job at living meaningful lives: “a bird is 
made in such a way that it can fly, gather food and build a nest, and when I see a bird doing 
these things I rejoice. Goats, hares and wolves are made in order to eat, multiply and feed 
their families, and when they do this I feel quite sure that they are happy and that their lives 
are meaningful.” (Tolstoy 1882, 68-9) 
What exactly that meaning consists in we cannot always say because it is their world and not 
ours that generates it. We cannot fully understand it because it is so different from ours, but it 
is not so alien either that it cannot be approximated through careful and caring observation 
and life-sharing. Take for instance the following description of a moment in the life of a 
hunting dog that Tolstoy gives his readers in Anna Karenina from the dog’s perspective: 
“Their smell struck her more and more strongly, more and more distinctly, and suddenly it 
became perfectly clear to her that one of them was there, behind that hummock, five steps 
away from her. She stopped and her whole body froze. On her short legs she could see 
nothing ahead of her, but she knew from the smell that it was sitting no more than five steps 
away. She stood, sensing it more and more and delighting in the anticipation. Her tense tail 
was extended and only its very tip twitched. Her mouth was slightly open, her ears pricked up 
a little. One ear had got folded back as she ran, and she was breathing heavily but cautiously, 
and still more cautiously she turned more with her eyes than with her head to look at her 
master. He, with his usual face but with ever terrible eyes, was coming, stumbling over 
hummocks, and extremely slowly as it seemed to her.” (Tolstoy 1878, 593) 
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When we judge the lives of non-human animals to be devoid of meaning or pointless and 
therefore ultimately not worth living, we give expression not so much to the comparative 
poverty of their lives (being unconcerned by what is objectively worthy of being loved, 
incapable of transcending their animal nature, storyless, temporally challenged, and 
uncreative), but instead to our own humanist prejudices, the limitations of our imagination, 
and our unwillingness to empathically relate to the specific circumstances of their life. Non-
human animals may have no access to the goods that we pursue, and even if they did would 
probably lack the comprehension to see any point in pursuing them. They cannot understand 
why we do the things we do and what they mean to us. However, we don’t have any access to 
the goods they pursue either. The very fact that we don’t see much point in doing what they 
do shows clearly enough there is something here that we are missing. Generally speaking, if 
there is something we don’t see, the reason may be that what we don’t see is not there, or 
alternatively we may simply be blind to it. Accordingly, if the lives of non-human animals 
appear meaningless to us and not worth living, then this is either because they are indeed 
meaningless and not worth living or because we fail to recognize and appreciate what makes 
them meaningful. Given that animals, under normal circumstances, give no indication 
whatsoever that they find their life not worth living, the latter is far more likely. “Take our 
dogs and ourselves,” writes William James in his seminal essay “On a Certain Blindness in 
Human Beings” (James 1899, 267), “connected as we are by a tie more intimate than most 
ties in this world; and yet, outside of that tie of friendly fondness, how insensible, each of us, 
to all that makes life significant for the other! – we to the rapture of bones under hedges, or 
smells of trees and lamp-posts, they to the delights of literature and art. As you sit reading the 
most moving romance you ever fell upon, what sort of a judge is your fox-terrier of your 
behavior? With all his good will toward you, the nature of your conduct is absolutely 
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excluded from his comprehension. To sit there like a senseless statue, when you might be 
taking him to walk and throwing sticks for him to catch!”  
If dogs could philosophize about meaning in life, they would probably come to the 
conclusion that the life of a human is of little value and, all things considered, not really 
worth living at all. Who, after all, would want to spend a large part of their life sitting on a 
chair gazing intently at a computer screen and tapping away with their fingers on a board? 
Instead of wilfully ignoring the possibility that a life that is very different from ours can 
possibly be meaningful, we should follow James’s advice that “where-ever there is conflict of 
opinion and difference of vision, we are bound to believe that the truer side is the side that 
feels the more, and not the side that feels the less.” (Ibid, 268) This also means that we should 
not pronounce on the “meaninglessness of forms of existence other than our own; and it 
commands us to tolerate, respect, and indulge those whom we see harmlessly interested and 
happy in their own ways, however unintelligible these may be to us. Hands off; neither the 
whole of truth nor the whole of good is revealed to any single observer”. (Ibid, 264) 
It is a rather regrettable fact of our modern lives that we are often blind to the “fundamental 
static goods of life”, to the good “of seeing, smelling, tasting, sleeping, and daring and doing 
with one’s body” (Ibid, 258) and the “intense interest that life can assume when brought 
down to the non-thinking level, the level of pure sensorial perception” (Ibid, 259). 
Contemporary philosophers have a tendency to see the notion of a meaningful life as reserved 
for the few - those who make a lasting impact, those who change the world. Even those who 
acknowledge that non-human animals can have meaningful lives tend to use examples that 
strongly suggest that it is the exception rather than the rule for non-human animals to live 
meaningful lives and that meaning results primarily if not exclusively from extraordinary 
accomplishments, especially in the service of humanity or at least some fraction of humanity. 
Thus Joshua Thomas (2018, 266) uses as his prime examples for animals that lived a 
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meaningful life Smoky the dog, who “was found abandoned in a foxhole in the New Guinea 
jungle during World War II, and accompanied Corporal William Wynne through twelve 
combat missions over two years, earning eight battle stars and surviving 150 air raids and 
even a typhoon”, and the space dog Laika, who “started off life as a stray dog on the streets 
of Moscow but who was picked up by the Soviet Space Programme, underwent specialist 
cosmonaut training, and eventually became the first animal ever to orbit the earth.” When we 
focussing on such animals we make the same mistake as when we associate meaning in life 
primarily with people like Mother Teresa, Nelson Mandela, Vincent van Gogh, or Albert 
Einstein. The notion of a meaningful life needs to be democratised. Meaningful lives are not 
the exception; they are the rule. We don’t start from a position of meaninglessness and then 
acquire meaning only if we are particularly gifted, lucky, and hard-working. The default 
mode of existence is a life steeped in meaningfulness. What we should be concerned about is 
not how to give meaning to our lives, but how not to lose it.  
 
Conclusion 
Craig was not right about dogs. To the extent that people can live meaningful lives, lives that 
matter, have a point, and are worth living, non-human animals can too. Perhaps their lives 
don’t matter in the grand scheme of things. Perhaps they don’t lead anywhere. But if they 
don’t, then our human lives, for all we know, do not really lead anywhere either, not in the 
long run. We have no idea what if anything is “objectively valuable”. We have no idea 
whether there is any cosmic purpose to our lives that we fail to grasp, and even if there were, 
it would be of little use to us. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we can only 
assume that our life is meaningful to the extent that it is felt to be so, and there are myriad 
ways in which life can be felt to be meaningful, depending on who and what we are. 
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“Wherever a process of life communicates an eagerness to him who lives it, there the life 
becomes genuinely significant. Sometimes the eagerness is more knit up with the motor 
activities, sometimes with the perceptions, sometimes with the imagination, sometimes with 
reflective thought. But, wherever it is found, there is the zest, the tingle, the excitement of 
reality; and there is “importance” in the only real and positive sense in which importance ever 
anywhere can be.” (James 1899, 269) 
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